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Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.
Professor Emeritus of Law
George Washington University Law School
Washington, DC 20052
Email address: awilmarth@law.gwu.edu
August 8, 2022
Department of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20220
Re:

Request for Public Comment on
“Ensuring Responsible Development of
Digital Assets,” 87 Fed. Reg. 40881 (July
8, 2022)

Thank you for inviting the public to provide comments in response to President Biden’s
Executive Order No. 14067, “Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital Assets” (Mar. 9,
2022). In response to Parts III(C) and (D) of your request for comments, this letter addresses the
significant risks that digital stablecoins currently pose to U.S. financial markets and investors as
well as potential future dangers that stablecoins could create for our financial system, economy
and society. For the reasons set forth below, this letter contends that (1) stablecoins presently
pose significant risks to U.S. financial markets and investors, (2) stablecoins will create great
dangers for our financial system, economy and society if they become a widely-accepted form of
payment for consumer and commercial transactions, and (3) allowing Big Tech firms and other
commercial enterprises to issue and distribute stablecoins would seriously undermine our
nation’s longstanding policy of separating banking and commerce.
In view of the foregoing hazards, Congress and federal agencies should designate
stablecoins as deposits and require all issuers and distributors of stablecoins to be chartered as
FDIC-insured banks. In addition, Congress and federal agencies should reject proposals that
would (i) allow uninsured banks to issue or distribute stablecoins, or (ii) regulate stablecoin
providers in the same manner as money market funds, or (iii) provide pass-through federal
deposit insurance coverage to customers of nonbank stablecoin providers.
1. Stablecoins currently pose significant risks to financial markets and investors.
A stablecoin is a digital asset whose issuer states that the stablecoin will maintain parity
with a designated fiat currency. Most stablecoins are either asset-based stablecoins, which
maintain reserves, or algorithmic stablecoins that depend on an arbitrage-based trading
relationship with another digital coin.1 In July 2022, more than 90% of outstanding stablecoins
Mitsu Adachi et al., “Stablecoins’ role in crypto and beyond: functions, risks and policy,” §1, Macroprudential
Bulletin No. 18 (European Central Bank, July 11, 2022), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/financialstability/macroprudential-bulletin/html/ecb.mpbu202207_2~836f682ed7.en.html; Igor Markhov & Antoinette
Schoar, “Cryptocurrencies and Decentralized Finance (DeFi)” (April 24, 2022), at 20-21,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4104550; see also Financial Stability Board, Assessment of Risks to Financial Stability
1

were asset-backed stablecoins, and over 99% of those stablecoins stated that they would maintain
parity with the U.S. dollar.2
The volume of outstanding stablecoins mushroomed from less than $5 billion in January
2020 to about $150 billion in November 2021.3 The rapid expansion of the stablecoin market
mirrored the explosive growth in aggregate market prices for cryptocurrencies, which rose from
less than $250 billion in January 2020 to almost $3 trillion in November 2021.4 Following their
peak in November, total market prices for cryptocurrencies fell to $930 billion in June 2022
before recovering to $1.1 trillion in July.5 Since the beginning of 2020, price trends in
cryptocurrency markets have shown a strong correlation with price movements in U.S. securities
markets.6
The stablecoin market has followed a somewhat different pattern in recent months, due to
the growing significance of stablecoins as payment instruments and collateral for transactions in
cryptocurrency markets. The volume of outstanding stablecoins increased from $150 billion in
November 2021 to $183 billion in April 2022 before declining to less than $143 billion at the
end of July.7 The key event that disrupted the growth of the stablecoin market was the collapse
of the algorithmic stablecoin Terra (along with its paired cryptocurrency Luna) during the second
week of May. Terra’s demise caused the volume of outstanding algorithmic stablecoins to
decline from $34 billion to $12 billion by the end of July.8 Terra’s downfall also had a
significant impact on Tether, the largest asset-backed stablecoin. Due to concerns about the
adequacy of Tether’s reserves, Tether temporarily failed to maintain parity with the U.S. dollar,
and the outstanding volume of Tether stablecoins declined from $83 billion in May to less than
$66 billion at the end of July.9
from Crypto-assets (Feb. 16, 2022) [hereinafter FSB Report on Risks of Crypto-assets], https://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/P160222.pdf.
2
The Block, https://www.theblock.co/data/decentralized-finance/stablecoins (Graphs for “Total Fiat-backed
Stablecoin Supply,” “Total Crypto-backed and Algorithmic Stablecoin Supply,” and “Share of Fiat Stablecoin
Supply (in USD) by Currency”) (visited on Aug. 2, 2022).
3
Id. (“Total Stablecoin Supply” graph).
4
The Block, https://www.theblock.co/data/crypto-markets/prices (“Crypto Total Marketcap” graph) (visited on Aug.
2, 2022).
5
Id.
6
Scott Chipolina, “Crypto prices rise as traders dip back into digital asset market,” Financial Times (July 30, 2022),
https://www.ft.com/content/89312290-ce33-4f94-9789-07fc7d7ab853; Alexandra Scaggs, “Crypto confirmed
casino,” Financial Times (July 11, 2022) (discussing reasons for the strong correlation between cryptocurrency
prices and the S&P 500 index since early 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/57e783da-16cb-4d58-af7f23ba87499ed5; Karen Langley et al., “U.S. Stocks Rise, Giving S&P 500 Best Month Since 2020,” Wall Street
Journal (July 29, 2022) (reporting that the S&P 500 index rose by 9.1% during July 2022 but was still 13% below
its closing value at the end of 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/global-stocks-markets-dow-update-07-29-202211659080320; Akane Otani, “Stock Markets Post Worst Half of a Year in Over Five Decades,” Wall Street Journal
(July 1, 2022) (stating that the S&P 500 index fell by 21% during the first half of 2022, “suffering its worst first half
of a year since 1970”), https://www.wsj.com/articles/markets-head-toward-worst-start-to-a-year-in-decades11656551051
7
The Block, https://www.theblock.co/data/decentralized-finance/stablecoins (“Total Stablecoin Supply” graph)
(visited on Aug. 2, 2022).
8
Id. (“Total Crypto-backed and Algorithmic Stablecoin Supply” graph).
9
Id. (“Total Fiat-backed Stablecoin Supply” graph); see also Vicky Ge Huang, “More Hedge Funds Are Betting
Against Tether as Crypto Melts Down,” Wall Street Journal (June 27, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/morehedge-funds-are-betting-against-tether-as-crypto-melts-down-11656322200.
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Stablecoins play crucial roles in digital asset markets. Stablecoins are the most widelyaccepted instruments for making payments or providing collateral for trading, borrowing, and
lending transactions involving digital assets. Stablecoins provide the principal link between
traditional financial markets and digital asset markets because participants usually convert their
fiat money into stablecoins before engaging in transactions involving digital assets.10
The stablecoin market is highly concentrated. The three largest stablecoins – Tether,
USD Coin (USDC), and Binance USD Coin (BUSD) – currently account for 90% of outstanding
stablecoins. 11 All three of the largest stablecoins are closely connected to leading cryptocurrency
exchanges. BUSD, the third-largest stablecoin, is issued by Binance, the world's largest
cryptocurrency exchange. Binance offers trading and lending services to holders of BUSD and
other stablecoins.12
USDC, the second-largest stablecoin, is issued by Centre, a consortium that is jointly
owned (on an equal basis) by Circle and Coinbase. Coinbase is the world's seventh-largest
cryptocurrency exchange, and it offers trading and lending services to holders of USDC and
other stablecoins.13 Tether, the largest stablecoin, is owned by a holding company that also owns
Bitfinex, the world's eighth-largest cryptocurrency exchange. Bitfinex offers trading and lending
services to holders of Tether and other stablecoins.14
One indication of the growing significance of stablecoins within the crypto ecosystem is
that stablecoins have more than doubled their share of all cryptocurrencies (from about 5% to

Adachi et al., supra note 1, § 2; “Crypto Assets and Decentralized Finance through a Financial Stability Lens,”
Remarks by Lael Brainard, Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve Board (July 8, 2022), at 8; FSB Report on Risks of
Crypto-assets, supra note 1, at 11-14
11
On July 31, 2022, there were $65.5 billion of outstanding Tether stablecoins, $45.6 billion of outstanding USDC
stablecoins, and $17.9 billion of outstanding BUSD stablecoins. Those three stablecoins accounted for 90.5% of the
$142.5 billion total volume of outstanding stablecoins. The Block, https://www.theblock.co/data/decentralizedfinance/stablecoins (“Total Stablecoin Supply” graph) (visited Aug. 2, 2022).
12
“Binance Blog: What Is a Stablecoin? Here’s Where and How to Buy Them” (Feb. 17, 2022),
https://www.binance.com/en/blog/fiat/what-is-a-stablecoin-heres-where-and-how-to-buy-them421499824684903322; CoinMarketCap, “Top Cryptocurrency Spot Exchanges” (listing the world’s largest
cryptocurrency exchanges), https://coinmarketcap.com/rankings/exchanges/ (visited on Aug. 2, 2022).
13
“Circle blog: Coinbase and Circle co-found the CENTRE Consortium (Oct. 23, 2018),
https://www.circle.com/blog/coinbase-and-circle-co-found-the-centre-consortium; “Coinbase blog: Coinbase and
Circle announce the launch of USDC – a Digital Dollar” (Oct. 23, 2018), https://blog.coinbase.com/coinbase-andcircle-announce-the-launch-of-usdc-a-digital-dollar-2cd6548d237; CoinMarketCap, supra note 12; see also Circle
Acquisition Public Limited Company, Form S-4 Registration Statement (Aug. 6, 2021), at F-13, F-53 (stating that
Circle and Coinbase each own 50% of Centre, the consortium that controls USDC),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1876042/000110465921101498/tm2123712-1_s4.htm.
14
CoinMarketCap, supra note 12; Zeke Faux, “Anyone Seen Tether’s Billions?”, Bloomberg BusinessWeek (Oct. 7,
2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-10-07/crypto-mystery-where-s-the-69-billion-backing-thestablecoin-tether?sref=f7rH; Kadhim Shubber & Siddharth Venkataramakrishnan, “Tether: the former plastic
surgeon behind the crypto reserve currency,” Financial Times (July 15, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/4da3060c-8e1a-439f-a1d7-a6a4688ad6ca; In re: Tether and Bitfinex Crypto Asset
Litigation, 19 Civ. 9236 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2021), 2021 WL 4452181, at *2 (describing the joint control of
Tether and Bitfinex by the same holding company).
10
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more than 12%) since January 2020.15 Another and more ominous sign of the increasing
importance of stablecoins is that the Terra stablecoin’s collapse triggered a series of failures
among crypto firms. In early May 2022, Terra was the largest algorithmic stablecoin and had
about $18 billion of outstanding coins. Terraform Labs, which issued Terra, offered interest
rates of up to 20% to investors who loaned their Terra stablecoins to the firm. During a “run on
the bank” in the second week of May, Terra’s assets evaporated along with Terra’s sister
cryptocurrency, Luna, which previously had a reported value of $20 billion.16
The demise of Terra/Luna accelerated the sharp decline in cryptocurrency prices that was
already underway. The crisis at Terra/Luna also led to the collapse of Three Arrows, a large
hedge fund that invested primarily in cryptocurrencies. Three Arrows held highly leveraged
positions in Terra, Luna, and other speculative tokens. Three Arrows also borrowed
cryptocurrencies from investors and digital platforms and used those borrowed tokens to make
additional speculative bets. Three Arrows became insolvent soon after the downfall of
Terra/Luna.17
Three Arrows’ insolvency had a domino effect that caused the failures of prominent
trading and lending platforms for cryptocurrencies. By the end of July 2022, Voyager Digital,
Celsius, and Vauld had been placed in insolvency proceedings. In addition to making high-risk
loans to Three Arrows and other cryptocurrency investors, the failed platforms borrowed
cryptocurrencies from investors at high interest rates and made additional risky bets with the
borrowed tokens.18

15

See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text (describing the relative sizes of the stablecoin market and all
cryptocurrency markets).
16
Christian Davies & Song Jung-a, “$40bn crypto collapse turns South Korea against the ‘Lunatic’ leader,”
Financial Times (May 23, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/c46f767c-c8e3-47cf-b0a3-46d3b84498c3; Olga Karif,
“What Happens When a Crypto Blockchain Like Terra Dies (1),” Bloomberg Law (May 12, 2022); Alexander
Osipovich & Caitlin Ostroff, “Crash of TerraUSD Shakes Crypto: ‘There Was a Run on the Bank’,” Wall Street
Journal (May 12, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/crash-of-terrausd-shakes-crypto-there-was-a-run-on-thebank-11652371839.
17
Scott Chipolina & Adam Samson, “Crypto Hedge Fund Three Arrows Files for US bankruptcy,” Financial Times
(July 2, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/8e4538cc-e8c5-4cc2-9448-053074f72f67; David Z. Morris, “Satoshi
Wept: How Crypto Replayed the 2008 Financial Crisis,” CoinDesk (July 12, 2022),
https://www.coindesk.com/layer2/2022/07/12/satoshi-wept-how-crypto-replayed-the-2008-financial-crisis/; Serena
Ng et al., “Crypto Hedge Fund Three Arrows Ordered by Court to Liquidate,” Wall Street Journal (June 29, 2022),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/crypto-fund-three-arrows-ordered-to-liquidate-by-court-11656506404; Joanna
Ossinger et al., “Three Arrows Founders, En Route to Dubai, Describe ‘LTCM Moment’,” Bloomberg Law (July 22,
2022); Caitlin Ostroff & Vicky Ge Huang, “Crypto’s Domino Effect Is Widening, Threatening More Pain,” Wall
Street Journal July 2, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cryptos-domino-effect-is-widening-threatening-morepain-11656754202.
18
Eliot Brown & Yifan Wang, “Crypto Broker Voyager Digital Files for Bankruptcy Protection,” Wall Street
Journal (July 6, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/crypto-broker-voyager-digital-files-for-bankruptcy-protection11657098630; Alexander Gladstone et al., “Crypto Crash Drags Lender Celsius into Bankruptcy,” Wall Street
Journal (July 13, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/crypto-crash-drags-lender-celsius-network-into-bankruptcy11657758483; Vicky Ge Huang, “Peter Theil-Backed Crypto Lender Vauld Files for Protection Against Creditors,”
Wall Street Journal (July 20, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/peter-thiel-backed-crypto-lender-vauld-files-forprotection-against-creditors-11658337252; Morris, supra note 17; Kadhim Shubber & Joshua Oliver, “Inside
Celsius: how one of crypto’s biggest lenders ground to a halt,” Financial Times (July 13, 2022),
https://www.ft.com/content/4fa06516-119b-4722-946b-944e38b02f45.
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The crash in crypto markets that followed Terra/Luna’s downfall inflicted painful losses
on millions of retail investors. Terra, Voyager, Celsius, and other crypto firms told retail
investors that they could lend out their stablecoins and other cryptocurrencies and earn interest
rates up to 20%. Some crypto firms, including Celsius and Voyager, falsely represented to
customers that their investments would be as safe as deposits held by banks.19
Federal agencies have not issued investor protection rules for stablecoins and other
cryptocurrencies, and the absence of such rules has made ordinary investors highly vulnerable to
unfair and deceptive marketing practices by crypto firms. Vulnerabilities to abusive sales
practices are greatest among low- and moderate-income (LMI) investors as well as investors who
are less educated or members of minority communities. Survey results indicate that minority
investors are more likely to invest in cryptocurrencies than white investors, and a similar gap
exists between investors from LMI households without a college degree and investors who are
wealthy and highly educated.20 Sellers of crypto assets have intentionally targeted LMI
households and minority communities with aggressive sales pitches (often featuring celebrity
endorsements) that describe crypto investments as safer, more rewarding, and more inclusive
than traditional financial products. In February 2022, Crypto.com and several other crypto firms
paid millions of dollars to advertise their crypto offerings during Super Bowl LVI, a game
watched by more than 96 million people.21
David Benoit, “Crypto Broker Voyager’s Marketing on Safety of Customer Accounts Draws FDIC Scrutiny,”
Wall Street Journal (July 8, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fdic-scrutinizing-voyagers-marketing-on-safety-ofcustomer-deposit-accounts-11657212266; Rachel Louise Ensign & Angel Au-Eung, “They Thought ‘Crypto Banks’
Were Safe, and Then Came the Crash,” Wall Street Journal (July 23, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/theythought-crypto-banks-were-safe-and-then-came-the-crash-11658568780; Joshua Oliver, “Crypto voices: investors
speak about the market shock,” Financial Times (July 15, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/77e83f6a-57fe-465cae1a-f9512923fca4; Alexander Osipovich & Caitlin Ostroff, “TerraUSD Crash Led to Vanished Savings, Shattered
Dreams,” Wall Street Journal (May 27, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/terrausd-crash-led-to-vanished-savingsshattered-dreams-11653649201; Shubber & Oliver, supra note 18; Claire Williams, “Voyager is the tip of the
iceberg,” American Banker (July 20, 2022), available on Westlaw at 22701994.
20
Paul Krugman, “How cryptocurrencies became the new subprime,” New York Times (Jan. 30, 2022) (“According
to a survey by the research organization NORC, 44% of crypto investors are nonwhite, and 55% don't have a college
degree. This matches up with anecdotal evidence that crypto investing has become remarkably popular among
minority groups and the working class.”), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/27/opinion/cryptocurrency-subprimevulnerable.html; Rob Lenihan, “Is Crypto the New Subprime?”, TheStreet.com (Jan. 30, 2022) (discussing survey
results showing that “[t]wo-fifths of crypto traders are not white,” and “the average cryptocurrency trader is under
40 and does not have a college degree, . . . and over one-third have household incomes under $60,000 per year”),
https://www.thestreet.com/investing/cryptocurrency/is-crypto-the-new-subprime-crash-hits-mainstream-investorshard; Taylor Nicole Rogers, “Crypto collapse reverberates widely among black American investors,” Financial
Times (July 5, 2022) (reporting that “widespread losses caused by the cryptocurrency crash are even broader among
black investors”), https://www.ft.com/content/47d338e2-3d3c-40ce-8a09-abfa25c16a7f; see also Claire Williams,
“Black Innovators Did Some of the Earliest Work in Cryptocurrency. What Happens Now That It’s Mainstream?”,
Morning Consult (Dec. 9, 2021) (describing poll results showing that black adults are “more interested in
participating in a variety of crypto-related activities compared to U.S. adults overall, and white adults especially,”
and warning that black adults could be “overexposed to [crypto-related] risks because of high adoption rates and
interest”), https://morningconsult.com/2021/12/09/black-cryptocurrency-influencers-polling/.
21
Will Gotsegen, “Ads of the ‘Crypto Bowl’,” CoinDesk (Feb. 11, 2022),
https://www.coindesk.com/layer2/2022/02/08/ads-of-the-crypto-bowl/; Terry Nguyen, “The winner of this year’s
Super Bowl: Money,” Vox (Feb. 14, 2022) (“One of the consequences of crypto’s explosive growth throughout 2021
was a parallel boom in marketing.”), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/22925225/super-bowl-ads-money-cryptosports-betting; Rogers, supra note 20; Williams, supra note 20.
19
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Super Bowl LVI became known as the “Crypto Bowl” because of the prominent ads by
crypto firms urging ordinary individuals to be “bold” and invest in crypto assets. The chief
marketing officer for Crypto.com declared, “Crypto genuinely is for everybody,” and he
explained that his company’s Super Bowl ad would “reach everybody where they are . . . [I]t’s as
mass as you get.” The crypto industry’s advertising blitz during Super Bowl LVI was a
disturbing echo of a similar mass marketing of high-risk investments during Super Bowl XXXIV
in 2000. That game was called the “Dot Com Bowl” because more than a dozen dotcom firms
bought ads touting their speculative stocks. Several of those firms subsequently failed during the
stock market’s “dotcom crash” that began in March 2000.22
The failure of a medium-sized stablecoin – Terra – caused a serious disruption of the
crypto ecosystem. In view of the close ownership connections between leading cryptocurrency
exchanges and the three largest stablecoins – Tether, USDC and BUSD – the collapse of any of
those stablecoins could trigger a systemic meltdown in cryptocurrency markets. The risks of a
generalized panic would be even greater if any of those stablecoins failed during a serious crisis
affecting traditional financial markets.23
The risks of a systemic investor run on stablecoins are magnified by widely-shared
concerns about the adequacy of stablecoin reserves. Those concerns have not been allayed by
limited disclosures that stablecoin issuers provide about their reserves. In the absence of federal
rules governing stablecoin reserves, issuers are free to change the composition of their reserves
or modify their disclosures without prior notice. Tether’s reserves reportedly include large
amounts of risky commercial paper issued by Chinese firms and other Asian companies, and
Tether’s disclosures about its reserves are notoriously opaque.24 In addition, Tether could suffer
a substantial loss if creditors of Celsius successfully challenge Tether’s recovery of an $840
million loan of stablecoins that Tether made to Celsius. Tether reportedly recovered that loan
less than 90 days before Celsius filed for bankruptcy, and Tether’s recovery could potentially be
set aside by the bankruptcy court as a voidable preference.25
JD Alois, Crypto Bowl? Super Bowl Ads Dominated by Crypto Firms,” Crowdfund Insider (Feb. 14, 2022),
https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2022/02/186963-crypto-bowl-super-bowl-ads-dominated-by-crypto-firmscoinbase-promo-staggers-app/; Gotsegen, supra note 21 (quoting Stephen Kalifowitz); Nguyen, supra note 21; see
also Chaim Gartenberg, “Crypto’s big Super Bowl ads sold FOMO, not the future,” The Verge (Feb. 14, 2022),
https://www.theverge.com/2022/2/14/22933456/crypto-super-bowl-commercials-impact-advertisements-analysisfomo.
23
Adachi et al., supra note 1, §§ 2 & 4; FSB Report on Risks of Crypto-assets, supra note 1, at 1-2, 13-14, 19-20;
Gary B. Gorton, Chase P. Ross & Sharon Y. Ross, “Making Money” 3-5, 23-31 (Jan. 24, 2022),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=4021072; Makarov & Schoar, supra note 1, at 3-4, 37-38; Report on Stablecoins
(President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Nov. 2021), at 2-3, 10-12, 15 [hereinafter PWG Report on Stablecoins],
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/StableCoinReport_Nov1_508.pdf.
24
Adachi, supra note 1, § 4; Bryce Elder & Kadhim Shubber, “Tether’s mystery commercial paper exposure,”
Financial Times (June 30, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/59849743-850a-4f67-8e78-fdc68651d2d4; Faux,
supra note 14; FSB Report on Risks of Crypto-assets, supra note 1, at 11-15; Gary B. Gorton & Jeffrey Y. Zhang,
“Taming Wildcat Stablecoins” (Sept. 30, 2021), at 6-8, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3888752; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.,
“It’s Time to Regulate Stablecoins as Deposits and Require Their Issuers to Be FDIC-Insured Banks,” 41 Banking &
Financial Services Policy Report No. 2 (Feb. 2022), at 2, 16 (notes 14 & 15) [hereinafter Wilmarth, “Stablecoins”],
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=4000795.
25
Kadhim Shubber, “Tether’s recovery of an $840m loan scrutinized in Celsius bankruptcy,” Financial Times (July
26, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/3e19e36e-b3c7-44ca-8afe-af7e43d7c7e4.
22
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The crypto crash following Terra’s meltdown has not yet caused significant problems in
traditional financial markets. However, the next crisis involving the failure of a prominent
stablecoin could have more severe consequences for traditional markets. During the past few
years, mainstream institutional investors – including hedge funds, venture capital funds,
exchange-traded funds, pension funds, and other asset managers – have significantly increased
their investments in crypto firms and crypto assets.26 BlackRock recently formed a partnership
with Coinbase that will give allow Coinbase to provide digital assets and crypto trading and
lending services to BlackRock’s customers. In particular, Coinbase will offer its crypto products
and services to customers of Aladdin, BlackRock’s investment technology platform that
“supplies essential plumbing to the global investment industry.”27 Connections between crypto
markets and traditional financial markets are likely to multiply, thereby creating the risk that
future crises involving stablecoins and other crypto assets will have significant spillover effects
on traditional institutions and markets.28
The risks that stablecoins already pose to financial markets and investors demand a
vigorous response by Congress and federal agencies. As shown in the next two sections,
stablecoins will create even greater hazards for our financial system, economy, and society if
they become widely accepted for general-purpose payments and are issued or distributed by Big
Tech firms and other commercial enterprises.
2. Stablecoins will create great dangers for our financial system, economy, and
society if they become a widely-used form of payment for consumer and
commercial transactions.
At present, stablecoins are used mainly as payment instruments or collateral
for trading, borrowing, and lending transactions involving cryptocurrencies and other digital
assets.29 However, as the report issued in November 2021 by the President’s Working Group on
Financial Markets (PWG), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) pointed out, “several existing stablecoin issuers and
entities with stablecoin projects under development have the stated ambition for the stablecoins
they create to be used widely by retail users to pay for goods and services, by corporations in the
context of supply chain payments, and in the context of international remittances.”30 Several
FSB Report on Risks of Crypto-assets, supra note 1, at 1, 4-6; Ekin Genç, “How Are Institutions and Companies
Investing in Crypto?”, CoinDesk (June 24, 2022), https://www.coindesk.com/learn/how-are-institutions-andcompanies-investing-in-crypto/; “Deep Dive: How Institutional Investors Are Driving Crypto Adoption,” Vauld
(May 1, 2022), https://www.vauld.com/insights/the-growing-institutional-interest-in-the-crypto-space/; Paul Vigna,
“Wall Street Takes Lead in Crypto Investments,” Wall Street Journal (Feb. 27, 2022),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-street-takes-lead-in-crypto-investments-11645927004.
27
Oliver Ralph et al., “Coinbase forges deal to give BlackRock clients access to crypto,” Financial Times (Aug. 4,
2022), https://www.ft.com/content/57435d7a-c384-4fe5-b2b6-747b44363c5b; see also Brandy Betz, “BlackRock to
Offer Crypto for Institutional Investors Through Coinbase Prime,” CoinDesk (Aug. 4, 2022),
https://www.coindesk.com/business/2022/08/04/blackrock-to-offer-crypto-for-institutional-investors-throughcoinbase-prime/.
28
Adachi et al., supra note 1, § 4; FSB Report on Risks of Crypto-assets, supra note 1, at 4-20.
29
Adachi et al., supra note 1, §§ 2 & 3; PWG Report on Stablecoins, supra note 23, at 1-10; Wilmarth,
“Stablecoins,” supra note 24, at 1-2.
30
PWG Report on Stablecoins, supra note 23, at 8.
26
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companies that provide payment services for cryptocurrency transactions (including Circle and
PayPal) are reportedly working on or considering projects to develop stablecoins that could be
used for general-purpose payments in consumer and commercial transactions.31
As noted in the previous section, cryptocurrency markets have already established
extensive and growing links with traditional financial markets. Those connections would
become pervasive if stablecoins become a widely-accepted form of payment for consumer and
commercial transactions. Under those circumstances, the collapse of a leading stablecoin could
ignite a generalized panic in financial markets, paralyze the payments system, and inflict
widespread losses on consumers, business firms, investors, and financial institutions.32
It is not yet clear whether the blockchain (distributed ledger) technology currently used in
stablecoins will be successful in achieving the scale, speed, and cost efficiency necessary to
compete effectively with existing technologies for general-purpose payments, such as those used
by Visa and MasterCard. While permissionless blockchains do not appear to be feasible for
general-purpose payment applications, it is conceivable that permissioned blockchains could be
developed with the necessary scale, speed, and efficiency.33 Given the number of stablecoin
projects currently underway, it would be prudent for the federal government to plan for the
possibility that some types of stablecoins will be accepted as payment instruments for consumer
and commercial transactions.
The importance of stablecoins to our monetary and payments systems would increase
dramatically if they become a widely-accepted medium of payment for consumer and
commercial transactions. In that event, stablecoins would represent a major category of “private
money” comparable to money market funds (MMFs), which do not have explicit government
backing but rely on general expectations of government support during severe economic
downturns or financial crises.34
Additionally, issuers and distributors of stablecoins would become an important new
category of “shadow banks.” First-generation shadow banks – including securities brokerdealers, private equity firms, hedge funds, and other nonbank financial intermediaries – provide
functional substitutes for deposits, such as MMFs, securities repurchase agreements, and shortterm commercial paper. First-generation shadow banks also offer lending, payment, and other
financial services that mimic the activities of banks. First-generation shadow banks have long
engaged in regulatory arbitrage by offering bank-like services while avoiding compliance with
federal laws that establish essential safeguards for the safety, soundness, and stability of our
John Adams, “Inside Stripe’s second shot at crypto,” American Banker (Mar. 25, 2022), available on Westlaw at
2022 WLNR 9424491; John Adams, “PayPal poses big threat to banks in race to develop stablecoins,” American
Banker (Jan. 12, 2022), available on Westlaw at 2022 WLNR 1029010; FSB Report on Risks of Crypto-assets,
supra note 1, at 8-9, 14.
32
PWG Report on Stablecoins, supra note 23, at 8-15; Wilmarth, “Stablecoins,” supra note 24, at 2-3.
33
Adachi et al., supra note 1, § 3; Makarov & Schoar, supra note 1, at 3-6, 20-21, 26-42; see also Penny Crosman,
“U.S. banks give multibank blockchains another try,” American Banker (Dec. 29, 2021) (discussing the
development of “privately permissioned” blockchains that process payments for groups of participating banks),
available on Westlaw at 2021 WLNR 42392795.
34
Gorton & Zhang, supra note 24, at 3-13, 21-24; FSB Report on Risks of Crypto-assets, supra note 1, at 13-15;
PWG Report on Stablecoins, supra note 23, at 1-2, 12-15, Wilmarth, “Stablecoins,” supra note 24, at 2-4.
31
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banking system. The federal government bailed out first-generation shadow banks twice – in
2008 and 2020 – after those institutions assumed huge risks that contributed to the severity of
both crises.35 The federal government should not allow issuers and distributors of stablecoins to
become a second generation of shadow banks, thereby creating the likelihood of even larger and
more costly bailouts in the future.
3. Allowing Big Tech firms and other commercial enterprises to issue and
distribute stablecoins would undermine our nation’s longstanding policy of
separating banking and commerce.
Most leading stablecoins represent “deposits” under the generally-accepted functional
meaning of that term because their providers receive funds from customers in exchange for
stablecoins and promise to return their customers’ funds on demand or within an agreed period
of time.36 Unfortunately, federal authorities have not attempted to regulate stablecoins as
deposits. In addition, federal regulators have allowed nonbank stablecoin providers to combine
their de facto deposit-taking and other financial activities with commercial lines of business
because regulators do not treat those providers as “banks” for purposes of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act (FDI Act) and the Bank Holding Company Act (BHC Act).37
Thus, current regulatory approaches permit issuers and distributors of stablecoins – like
first-generation shadow banks – to operate without regard to the BHC Act’s longstanding policy
of separating banking and commerce.38 The PWG’s report on stablecoins warned that
combinations between stablecoin providers and commercial firms could have many harmful
consequences for our financial system and economy:
[T]he combination of a stablecoin issuer or wallet provider and a commercial firm
could lead to an excessive concentration of economic power. These policy
concerns are analogous to those traditionally associated with the mixing of
banking and commerce, such as advantages in accessing credit or using data to
market or restrict access to products. This combination could have detrimental

Gorton & Zhang, supra note 24, at 3-6, 21-24, 33, 38; Wilmarth, “Stablecoins,” supra note 24, at 3-4, 6, 11-13;
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The Pandemic Crisis Shows that the World Remains Trapped in a ‘Global Doom Loop’ of
Financial Instability, Rising Debt Levels, and Escalating Bailouts,” 40 Banking & Financial Services Policy Report
No. 8 (Aug. 2021), at 2-14, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3901967.
36
See Moneygram Int’l, Inc. v. Commissioner, 999 F.3d 269, 274-77 (5th Cir. 2021) (applying a functional
definition of “deposits”); United States v. Jenkins, 943 F.2d 167, 172-74 (2d Cir.) (same), cert denied, 502 U.S.
1014 (1991); see also Gorton & Zhang, supra note 24, at 6-16 (discussing the functional similarities between several
stablecoins and bank deposits, and stating that “issuers of stablecoins are essentially unregulated banks,” id. at 6);
Wilmarth, “Stablecoins,” supra note 24, at 7-9 (explaining why many stablecoins qualify as “deposits” under the
generally-accepted functional meaning of that term).
37
Wilmarth, “Stablecoins,” supra note 24, at 2-4, 7-12.
38
Id. at 3-4, 11-13; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The OCC’s and FDIC’s Attempts to Confer Banking
Privileges on Nonbanks and Commercial Firms Violate Federal Laws and Are Contrary to Public Policy,” 39
Banking & Financial Services Policy Report No. 10 (Oct. 2020), at 1, 6-11 (discussing the great importance of the
BHC Act’s policy of separating banking and commerce) [hereinafter Wilmarth, “Banking Privileges”], available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3750964.
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effects on competition and lead to market concentration in sectors of the real
economy.39
Despite the PWG’s warning, current regulatory practices would not stop Amazon, Apple,
Google, Meta, Microsoft and other Big Tech firms from offering stablecoins to their customers
as de facto deposits and payment devices along with other financial services. Big Tech firms
already enjoy significant advantages over traditional providers of financial services in areas such
as automation, artificial intelligence, data management, and mobile payments. The ability of Ant
Financial (Alipay) and Tencent (WeChat Pay) to dominate Chinese consumer financial markets –
particularly before the Chinese government cracked down on both companies in 2020 – stands as
a clear warning sign concerning the dominant market power that Big Tech firms could
potentially exercise over our financial system, economy, and society if they are allowed to offer
stablecoins together with lending, payment, and other financial services.40
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) recently highlighted the “dramatic
growth” of Ant Financial/Alipay and Tencent/WeChat Pay in China during the past decade. In
2021, Alipay and WeChat Pay offered payment, insurance, investment, and lending services to
more than 2 billion customers. Based on China’s experience, the CFPB warned that Big Tech
firms in the U.S. could potentially “leverage massive installed consumer bases to quickly gain
scale in new payment businesses,” and “the market power of these companies would then be
extended into the payments space.”41 CFPB Director Rohit Chopra highlighted the threats to
consumer welfare that would arise if Big Tech firms are allowed to build financial services
platforms that “intrusively” gain an “extraordinary window” into consumer preferences and
behavior.42
Preventing Big Tech firms from offering stablecoins as de facto deposits and payment
devices should be a top priority for financial regulators and Congress. The treasure trove of
39

PWG Report on Stablecoins, supra note 23, at 14.
Wilmarth, “Stablecoins, supra note 24, at 2, 11-13; see also Raúl Carrillo, Testimony before the Subcommittee on
Consumer Protection and Financial Institutions of the House Committee on Financial Services (April 15, 2021), at
5-9 [hereinafter Carrillo Testimony], https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/BA15/20210415/111447/HHRG-117BA15-Wstate-CarrilloR-20210415.pdf; Kathryn Petralia, Thomas Philippon, Tara Rice & Nicholas Véron, Banking
Disrupted? Financial Intermediation in an Era of Transformational Technology 25–38, 44–82 (Geneva Reports on
the World Economy 22, 2019), https://www.cimb.ch/uploads/1/1/5/4/115414161/banking_disrupted_geneva221.pdf; Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets: Majority Staff Report and Recommendations (Subcommittee
on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 2020) [hereinafter
2020 House Majority Staff Report on Competition in Digital Markets],
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf;.
41
The Convergence of Payments and Commerce: Implications for Consumers (Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, Aug. 2022), at 9-11, 16-18 (quotes at 10, 18),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_convergence-payments-commerce-implicationsconsumers_report_2022-08.pdf; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “Wirecard and Greensill Scandals Confirm
Dangers of Mixing Banking and Commerce,” 40 Banking & Financial Services Policy Report No. 5 (May 2021), at
1, 13 (explaining that Ant Financial and Tencent became “leading suppliers of deposit, payment, lending, and asset
management services in China by leveraging their dominant positions in ecommerce and exploiting lenient
government policies’) [hereinafter Wilmarth, “Wirecard and Greensill”] available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3849567.
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Stefania Palma, “Top US regulator fires warning shot after Apple’s push into lending,” Financial Times (July 27,
2022) (quoting Mr. Chopra), https://www.ft.com/content/399c177f-e5da-491a-b653-afe953bbdce0.
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nonpublic customer information that Big Tech firms would capture by offering deposit and
payment services is illustrated by the huge data set assembled by JPMorgan Chase Institute
(JPMCI). JPMCI has compiled and analyzed a massive pool of information drawn from the
records of JPMorgan Chase (JPMC), the largest U.S. bank. JPMCI’s data pool documents the
“saving, spending, and borrowing habits of the bank’s customers.” The strategic importance of
JPMCI’s data pool is confirmed by the decision of the Federal Reserve (Fed) to review JPMCI’s
research “when weighing interest-rate decisions.”43 Allowing Big Tech firms to compile similar
data sets from their offerings of stablecoins would increase exponentially their existing ability to
leverage and monetize their customers’ personal information and to invade their customers’
privacy by secretly transferring that information to third-party sellers of goods and services.44
Our nation stands at a crossroads. We can maintain the BHC Act’s longstanding policy
of separating banking and commerce, thereby preserving a financial system, an economy, and a
society that are not compromised by toxic conflicts of interest, exploited by unfair competitive
advantages, and dominated by the overwhelming market power and political influence of Big
Tech firms and other banking-and-commercial conglomerates. Or we can allow Big Tech firms
and other commercial giants to use stablecoins as building blocks for massive shadow banking
empires, thereby subverting the BHC Act’s separation of banking and commerce. In that event,
Big Tech firms and other commercial behemoths could potentially dominate our banking
industry and financial system, thereby creating the evils that the BHC Act was designed to
prevent.45
4. Congress should designate stablecoins as deposits and require all issuers and
distributors of stablecoins to be FDIC-insured banks, thereby bringing all
stablecoin providers within the scope of the FDI Act and the BHC Act.
The PWG made the right decision when it recommended that Congress should pass
legislation mandating that all issuers of stablecoins must be FDIC-insured banks.46
Implementing the PWG’s recommendation is vitally important to ensure the stability of our
financial system and the welfare of our economy and society. Designating stablecoins as
deposits and requiring all issuers and distributors of stablecoins to be FDIC-insured banks would
ensure that all stablecoin providers and their parent companies must comply with the FDI Act
and the BHC Act.47
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The FDI Act and the BHC Act establish crucial safeguards that require FDIC-insured
banks and their parent companies to operate in a manner consistent with the public interest.
Those safeguards should apply to issuers of stablecoins as well as distributors of stablecoins
issued by other companies. Firms that distribute stablecoins to the public should not be allowed
to avoid compliance with the FDI Act and the BHC Act simply because their deposit-taking and
payment networks use stablecoins issued by other companies.
The public interest mandates governing FDIC-insured banks include: (a) deposit
insurance coverage, payment of risk-based deposit insurance premiums, and reporting and
examination requirements under 12 U.S.C. §§ 1817, 1820 & 1821; (b) supervisory and
enforcement powers granted to federal bank regulators under 12 U.S.C. § 1818; (c) procedures
for resolving failed and failing banks under 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(c), 1822 & 1823; (d) risk-based
capital requirements and other safety and soundness standards under 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831p-1 &
3901-07; (e) prompt corrective action remedies under 12 U.S.C. § 1831o; (f) safety and
soundness standards and protections for competition that must be considered when federal bank
regulators review proposed changes in control of banks and bank mergers under 12 U.S.C. §§
1817(j) & 1828(c); (f) prohibitions on abusive tying practices under 12 U.S.C. §§ 1971-77; (f)
“source of strength” obligations and capital requirements for parent companies of FDIC-insured
banks under 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831o-1 & 5371(b); (g) community reinvestment standards under 12
U.S.C. §§ 3901-08; (h) expedited funds availability requirements under 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-10;
and (i) disclosure requirements for deposits under 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-13.
The BHC Act requires all companies that own or control FDIC-insured banks to comply
with additional public interest safeguards, including (a) safety and soundness standards and
protections for competition that must be considered when the Fed reviews proposed acquisitions
of banks under 12 U.S.C. § 1842; (b) limitations on permissible nonbanking activities under 12
U.S.C. § 1843; (c) the authority of the Fed to conduct examinations, require reports, bring
enforcement actions, exercise consolidated supervision, and impose risk-based capital
requirements under 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818, 1844, 1847, & 5371(b); and (d) privacy protections that
(i) prohibit financial holding companies from disclosing nonpublic customer information to
unaffiliated third parties in violation of their customers’ instructions, and (ii) bar third parties
from using false or deceptive practices to obtain such information (15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-09, 682127).
Section 4 of the BHC Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843, prohibits companies that own or control
FDIC-insured banks from engaging in commercial activities or owning commercial enterprises.
The BHC Act’s longstanding policy of separating banking and commerce prevents the formation
of large banking-and-commercial conglomerates that would be likely to create great dangers for
our financial system, economy, and society, including (1) hazardous concentrations of economic
and financial power and political influence, (2) toxic conflicts of interest that would destroy the
ability of banks to act objectively in providing credit and other services, and (3) serious risks of
systemic contagion between the financial and commercial sectors of our economy that could
inflict enormous losses on the federal government’s safety net for banks – including the FDIC’s
deposit insurance fund, the Fed’s discount window loans, the Fed’s guarantee for interbank
payments made on Fedwire, and the federal government’s explicit and implicit backstops for
“too big to fail” banking organizations. By adopting the PWG’s recommendation, Congress
12

would maintain the BHC Act’s separation of banking and commerce by prohibiting Big Tech
firms and other commercial enterprises from owning or controlling stablecoin ventures.48
Some stablecoin providers would not be able or willing to comply with the FDI Act, and
some parent companies of stablecoin providers would not be able or willing to comply with the
BHC Act. The federal government should compel those providers and their parent companies to
leave our financial system. If we want to maintain a financial system that avoids systemic crises,
protects investors and consumers, provides sound credit on objective terms, and ensures fair
competition, we must require providers of deposit-like services and their parent companies to
comply with the same laws that apply to banks and their corporate owners.
5. Federal authorities should reject alternative approaches for regulating
stablecoins and their providers.
Congress and federal agencies should reject alternative approaches that have been
proposed as methods for dealing with stablecoins and their providers. In particular, Congress
and federal agencies should reject proposals that would allow uninsured banks to issue and
distribute stablecoins or that would regulate stablecoin providers in the same manner as money
market funds. In addition, the FDIC should not provide pass-through deposit insurance coverage
for stablecoins that are issued or distributed by nonbanks.
a. Congress should not allow uninsured banks to issue and distribute
stablecoins.
Congress should reject proposed legislation – such as the bill sponsored by Senators
Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) and Cynthia Lummis (R-WY) – that would allow uninsured state
banks and uninsured national banks to issue and distribute stablecoins. The Gillibrand-Lummis
bill would require the Fed to provide master accounts to uninsured stablecoin banks. Those
master accounts would enable uninsured stablecoin banks to receive Fed payment and settlement
services, including Fed guarantees for payments made on Fedwire, daylight overdraft privileges,
and instant payment services under the forthcoming FedNow program. In addition, uninsured
national stablecoin banks would become Fed member banks and could borrow from the Fed's
discount window.49
Until recently, a deposit-taking bank could not obtain a bank charter unless it was
approved for federal deposit insurance by the FDIC. The OCC has not issued charters for
uninsured deposit-taking national banks since Congress established the FDIC in 1933.50 Prior to
Wilmarth, “Banking Privileges,” supra note 38, at 6-11; Wilmarth, “Wirecard and Greensill,” supra note 41, at 1,
11-12; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The FDIC Should Not Allow Commercial Firms to Acquire Industrial Banks,” 39
Banking & Financial Services Policy Report No. 5 (May 2020), at 1, 2-10, available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3613022.
49
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50
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2019, every state required state-chartered banks that accepted deposits from the general public to
obtain federal deposit insurance. State laws mandating federal deposit insurance for deposittaking banks were the product of hard experience during the savings and loan and banking crises
of the 1980s and early 1990s. During those crises, systemic failures occurred among statechartered depository institutions that relied on private, state-sponsored deposit insurance
schemes. The collapse of private deposit insurance schemes inflicted severe losses on depositors
and local economies in several states, including Colorado, Ohio, Maryland and Rhode Island.51
Unfortunately, Wyoming (in 2019) and Nebraska (in 2020) decided to authorize charters
for banks that accept crypto deposits but do not have federal deposit insurance. As shown by the
collapse of the Terra stablecoin and the resulting turmoil in crypto markets, uninsured stablecoin
banks would create very significant risks and could destabilize our financial system and greatly
harm our economy. Congress should reject the Gillibrand-Lummis bill (and similar proposals)
and require all stablecoin providers to be FDIC-insured banks.52
b. Congress and federal regulators should not apply the regulatory model for
money market funds to nonbank stablecoin providers.
Congress and federal regulators should also reject proposals that would allow nonbanks
to issue and distribute stablecoins if they maintain reserves and provide disclosures similar to
those required for money market funds (MMFs). The federal government has already bailed out
MMFs twice – in 2008 and 2020 – when investors ran on MMFs because of widely-shared
concerns about the adequacy of their reserves. In May 2022, investors ran on the Terra
stablecoin and withdrew billions of dollars from the Tether stablecoin based on similar concerns
about the sufficiency of their reserves.
Based on those experiences and the collapse of private deposit insurance schemes during
the 1980s and early 1990s, it is abundantly clear that any regulatory model relying on private
reserves for stablecoins will almost certainly fail during future crises in the stablecoin market
(especially if those crises also affect broader segments of our financial markets). It would be a
huge mistake for Congress and federal agencies to adopt the same deeply-flawed regulatory
model that has repeatedly failed to ensure the stability and resilience of MMFs. Congress must
provide a credible backstop from the federal government for stablecoins – and must also compel
stablecoin providers to pay the regulatory price for that backstop – by mandating that all
stablecoin providers must be FDIC-insured banks with full access to the federal government’s
safety net for banks.53
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c. The FDIC should deny pass-through deposit insurance coverage for
stablecoins that are issued or distributed by nonbanks.
The FDIC should not allow nonbank stablecoin providers to obtain pass-through deposit
insurance coverage for their stablecoins by establishing custodial arrangements with FDICinsured banks. Authorizing pass-through deposit insurance for funds held by custodial banks on
behalf of stablecoin purchasers would involve a host of operational problems. One of the most
significant challenges would be to ensure that either the nonbank stablecoin provider or the
custodial bank maintained accurate and current records showing the identity of each customer
whose funds are held by the custodial bank and the amount of that customer’s funds. It would be
extremely difficult for stablecoin providers and custodial banks to maintain and update such
information in a continuous and timely manner, especially as the ownership of stablecoins by
customers and the amount of their funds held by the custodial bank would be likely to change
very rapidly.54
Pass-through deposit insurance coverage would be likely to create confusion among
customers holding stablecoins about the actual protection they receive from such coverage.
Nonbank stablecoin providers would have perverse incentives to exploit customer confusion by
overstating the amount of protection provided by pass-through coverage. The FDIC and the Fed
recently issued a joint cease-and-desist letter demanding that Voyager Digital stop
misrepresenting the scope of deposit insurance coverage provided to its customers under a
custodial arrangement with Metropolitan Commercial Bank. According to the FDIC and the
Fed, Voyager made “false and misleading” representations indicating that “(1) Voyager itself is
FDIC-insured; (2) customers who invested with the Voyager cryptocurrency platform would
receive FDIC insurance coverage for all funds provided to, held by, on, or with Voyager; and (3)
the FDIC would insure customers against the failure of Voyager itself.”55
The FDIC’s and Fed’s joint letter provided cold comfort to Voyager’s customers because
Voyager had already suspended withdrawals of their funds and filed for bankruptcy before the
letter was issued. Published reports indicate that other crypto firms have probably made similar
misrepresentations about the scope of protection provided to their customers by custodial
arrangements with FDIC-insured banks.56 The FDIC should avoid the risk of such fraudulent
practices in the future by denying pass-through deposit insurance coverage for all nonbank
stablecoin providers, even if they establish custodial agreements with FDIC-insured banks.
The FDIC should deny pass-through deposit insurance coverage for another and more
fundamental reason. Granting pass-through coverage would allow nonbanks – including Big
Tech firms and other commercial enterprises – to offer stablecoins that function as de facto
deposits and payment instruments and receive benefits from federal safety net protections that
Congress has reserved for FDIC-insured banks. Commercial firms and other nonbanks would
Wilmarth, “Stablecoins,” supra note 24, at 13-14.
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exploit those benefits without complying with the crucial safeguards mandated by the FDI Act
and the BHC Act. Thus, granting pass-through deposit insurance coverage for nonbank
stablecoins would (1) compromise the integrity and effectiveness of our bank regulatory system
and facilitate the growth of a second generation of shadow banks, and (2) undermine our national
policy of separating banking and commerce by enabling commercial firms to compete directly
with FDIC-insured banks.57 The FDIC should deny pass-through coverage to prevent such
outcomes.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Congress and federal agencies should designate
stablecoins as deposits and should require all issuers and distributors of stablecoins to be FDICinsured banks. Congress and federal agencies should reject alternative approaches for regulating
stablecoins and their providers. The foregoing steps are urgently needed to remove the great
dangers that stablecoins pose to our financial system, economy, and society.
Thank you for your consideration of the foregoing comments. 58
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